Flight Details

The incident involved Lufthansa Flight LH1140, an Airbus A321-231 (registered D‑AISO), on 17 February 2024. The jet was en route from Frankfurt (FRA) to Seville (SVQ) with 199 passengers and 6 crew aboard.

Incident Summary

Spanish investigators (CIAIAC) report that while cruising at 35,000 ft, the first officer collapsed in the cockpit from a sudden medical emergency just after the captain had left the flight deck for a lavatory break. For about ten minutes the autopilot flew the A321 without an active pilot at the controls. During this time the unconscious first officer involuntarily moved controls (for example, a hard rudder input caused a slight heading change, which the autopilot automatically compensated). Meanwhile the captain attempted to re‑enter the cockpit – unsuccessfully at first – and after multiple code entries finally used an emergency code. The door then unlocked and the captain regained the controls about ten minutes after the incapacitation began. He diverted the flight to Madrid Barajas, where the plane landed safely. None of the 205 occupants (passengers and crew) was injured.

Timeline of Events

• 10:31 UTC (approx.) – Captain departs cockpit: The 43-year-old captain left the flight deck to use the toilet, leaving the 38-year-old first officer alone. According to the Spanish report, the FO appeared "able and alert" before the captain left.
• 10:31:36 – First officer incapacitated: Just 36 seconds after the captain departed, the first officer suffered a sudden seizure ("sudden and severe incapacitation") and lost consciousness. In the minutes that followed, his limp inputs (e.g. pressing rudder and flipping switches) were unintentionally made as he was unconscious, but the engaged autopilot kept the jet flying steadily.
• ~10:32 to 10:45 – Attempts to alert: The captain, outside the locked cockpit, repeatedly tried the normal door‑unlock code (five times) and a cabin crew member tried phoning the cockpit, but heard no response. After about 2½ minutes he entered the emergency override code. Just as the safety delay elapsed, the incapacitated first officer (now regaining partial consciousness) manually opened the cockpit door from the inside.
• ~10:41 – Captain regains control: Roughly 10 minutes after the seizure began, the captain re-entered and took command of the aircraft. He observed that the co-pilot was pale, sweating and unsteady, so he requested medical assistance from the cabin crew. A doctor on board helped administer aid. The captain decided to make an urgent diversion to Madrid (the nearest suitable airport).
• Arrival in Madrid: The A321 landed safely at Madrid Barajas about 20 minutes after beginning the diversion. All onboard disembarked without injury. The first officer was taken to a hospital, where doctors identified a neurological condition as the cause of his collapse. His pilot medical certificate was immediately suspended.

Passengers and Crew Safety

All 199 passengers and 6 crew escaped unharmed. After landing, Lufthansa reported that no injuries occurred during the incident. On-board medical assistance was provided immediately: cabin crew and a traveling doctor attended to the co-pilot's health. The captain's prompt decision-making and emergency diversion ensured the safety of everyone on board. In later follow-up, investigators noted that the first officer had no recollection of the event and that his serious health issue had not been previously detected.

Autopilot Response

Throughout the event the A321's autopilot remained engaged and held the aircraft's flight path. Investigators specifically noted that despite the first officer's uncontrolled inputs (e.g. an abrupt rudder pedal force), the autopilot compensated and kept the plane stable. AP News similarly reported that "the aircraft was able to continue flying in a stable manner thanks to the active autopilot" while the co-pilot was incapacitated. In standard commercial operations, autopilots are designed to maintain set altitude, heading and speed, so in such an emergency the plane will generally remain on course until crew intervention. However, autopilot systems do not autonomously land or respond to unplanned emergencies; it is up to the remaining pilot or crew to handle the diversion. (Notably, newer aircraft may have "autoland" features for extreme cases, but the A321 relies on manual diversion procedures.) In this case, the autopilot's stability gave the captain valuable time to diagnose the problem, gain cockpit access, and navigate to a safe landing airport.

Official Statements and Findings

The details above come from the final Spanish accident investigation report (CIAIAC) released in May 2025. Lufthansa acknowledged the report but declined to release its internal findings. In media inquiries, the airline stated that it was "aware of the investigation report" and that its Flight Safety Department had conducted its own review. Lufthansa added that it would "not comment beyond" this report, as noted in German press.

No German aviation authority (LBA) report has been publicly released, but the Spanish investigation's recommendations have been forwarded to European regulators. The CIAIAC specifically recommended that the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) circulate the incident details to airlines to "reassess the risks associated with a pilot remaining alone on the flightdeck". This follows standard post‑Germanwings procedures: after the 2015 crash of Germanwings Flight 9525, carriers had briefly required two people at the controls at all times. (Lufthansa later modified that procedure and currently allows one pilot to leave if a trained crew member covers the cockpit entry code.)